Arrow’s impossibility theorem
E115290
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
All labels observed (4)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Arrow’s impossibility theorem canonical | 4 |
| Arrow's impossibility theorem | 1 |
| Arrow’s general possibility theorem | 1 |
| Arrow’s paradox | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T972459 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
Target entity: Arrow’s impossibility theorem Context triple: [Collective Choice and Social Welfare, mainTopic, Arrow’s impossibility theorem]
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A.
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Collective Choice and Social Welfare is a foundational work in social choice theory that rigorously examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into collective decisions while addressing issues of welfare, justice, and fairness.
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B.
Inequality Reexamined
Inequality Reexamined is a philosophical and economic work by Amartya Sen that critically analyzes traditional views of inequality and justice through his capabilities approach.
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C.
On Equilibrium
On Equilibrium is a philosophical work by John Ralston Saul that explores the importance of balancing key human qualities—such as reason, ethics, and common sense—to create a more humane and democratic society.
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D.
Essay on the Ballot
Essay on the Ballot is a political treatise by philosopher and economist James Mill that argues for the use of secret voting as a means to protect voters’ independence and promote representative government.
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E.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Target entity: Arrow’s impossibility theorem Target entity description: Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
A.
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Collective Choice and Social Welfare is a foundational work in social choice theory that rigorously examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into collective decisions while addressing issues of welfare, justice, and fairness.
-
B.
Inequality Reexamined
Inequality Reexamined is a philosophical and economic work by Amartya Sen that critically analyzes traditional views of inequality and justice through his capabilities approach.
-
C.
On Equilibrium
On Equilibrium is a philosophical work by John Ralston Saul that explores the importance of balancing key human qualities—such as reason, ethics, and common sense—to create a more humane and democratic society.
-
D.
Essay on the Ballot
Essay on the Ballot is a political treatise by philosopher and economist James Mill that argues for the use of secret voting as a means to protect voters’ independence and promote representative government.
-
E.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (47)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
impossibility theorem
ⓘ
result in social choice theory ⓘ theorem ⓘ |
| alsoKnownAs |
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
ⓘ
surface form:
Arrow’s general possibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem ⓘ
surface form:
Arrow’s paradox
|
| appliesTo |
rank-order voting systems
ⓘ
social welfare functions ⓘ |
| assumes |
at least three alternatives
ⓘ
complete and transitive individual preference orderings ⓘ individuals have rational (transitive) preferences ⓘ |
| axiom |
Pareto efficiency
ⓘ
completeness of the social preference relation ⓘ independence of irrelevant alternatives ⓘ non-dictatorship ⓘ transitivity of the social preference relation ⓘ unrestricted domain ⓘ |
| concerns | aggregation of individual preferences into a social ranking ⓘ |
| conclusion | no rank-order voting system can satisfy all Arrow axioms simultaneously ⓘ |
| contributedTo |
Kenneth Arrow
ⓘ
surface form:
Kenneth Arrow’s Nobel Prize in Economics
|
| domain |
collective decision-making
ⓘ
preference aggregation ⓘ |
| field |
social choice theory
ⓘ
voting theory ⓘ welfare economics ⓘ |
| formulatedBy | Kenneth Arrow ⓘ |
| hasConsequence |
no universally fair rank-order aggregation rule exists
ⓘ
trade-offs among fairness criteria in voting system design ⓘ |
| implies |
every social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s other axioms is dictatorial
ⓘ
there is no perfect voting rule meeting all Arrow fairness criteria ⓘ |
| influenced |
axiomatic welfare economics
ⓘ
mechanism design theory ⓘ public choice theory ⓘ theory of voting rules ⓘ |
| mathematicalFramework | axiomatic approach ⓘ |
| nobelPrizeRelatedYear | 1972 ⓘ |
| publicationYear | 1951 ⓘ |
| publishedIn | Social Choice and Individual Values ⓘ |
| recognizedAs | foundational result in social choice theory ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Condorcet paradox
ⓘ
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem ⓘ Sen’s liberal paradox ⓘ impossibility results in social choice ⓘ |
| states | no social welfare function satisfies unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, IIA, and non-dictatorship for three or more options ⓘ |
| strengthenedEditionYear | 1963 ⓘ |
| usesConcept |
ordinal preferences
ⓘ
preference ordering ⓘ social welfare function ⓘ |
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Subject: Arrow’s impossibility theorem Description of subject: Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
Referenced by (7)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.