Triple
T5114183
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Arrow’s impossibility theorem |
E115290
|
entity |
| Predicate | alsoKnownAs |
P39
|
FINISHED |
| Object | Arrow’s general possibility theorem |
E115290
|
NE FINISHED |
How this triple was built (2 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: Arrow’s general possibility theorem | Statement: [Arrow’s impossibility theorem, alsoKnownAs, Arrow’s general possibility theorem]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Arrow’s general possibility theorem Context triple: [Arrow’s impossibility theorem, alsoKnownAs, Arrow’s general possibility theorem]
-
A.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
chosen
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
B.
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Collective Choice and Social Welfare is a foundational work in social choice theory that rigorously examines how individual preferences can be aggregated into collective decisions while addressing issues of welfare, justice, and fairness.
-
C.
Condorcet paradox
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
-
D.
The Calculus of Consent
The Calculus of Consent is a foundational work in public choice theory that analyzes how constitutional rules and collective decision-making processes shape political and economic outcomes.
-
E.
expected utility theory (with John von Neumann)
Expected utility theory (with John von Neumann) is a foundational framework in economics and decision theory that models how rational agents make choices under uncertainty by maximizing the expected value of a utility function.
- F. None of above.
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Provenance (3 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69bd4441d1648190a54a533895041987 |
completed | March 20, 2026, 12:57 p.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69bd75cd13a08190b53e67ba65333557 |
completed | March 20, 2026, 4:29 p.m. |
| NED1 | Entity disambiguation (via context triple) | batch_69bebaadfaac8190aa0407196e5c4c20 |
completed | March 21, 2026, 3:35 p.m. |
Created at: March 20, 2026, 1:41 p.m.