Statements (49)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
game theory concept
|
| gptkbp:analyzes |
gptkb:Nash_equilibrium
gptkb:Perfect_Bayesian_equilibrium sequential equilibrium |
| gptkbp:describes |
strategic communication
|
| gptkbp:example |
peacock's tail
education as a signal warranty in product markets |
| gptkbp:field |
biology
economics game theory political science |
| gptkbp:firstFormalizedBy |
gptkb:Michael_Spence
|
| gptkbp:firstFormalizedIn |
1973
|
| gptkbp:hasType |
pooling equilibrium
separating equilibrium semi-separating equilibrium |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
signaling games
|
| gptkbp:involves |
receiver
sender |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Michael_Spence
gptkb:Spence_signaling_model gptkb:Bayesian_games information economics asymmetric information evolutionary game theory mechanism design screening signaling theory principal-agent problem costly signaling cheap talk games communication games reputation games screening games signaling equilibrium |
| gptkbp:studiedBy |
gptkb:economist
biologists political scientists |
| gptkbp:studies |
incentives
information asymmetry cheap talk credible signaling |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:job_market_signaling
advertising political campaigns animal communication |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Bayesian_games
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|