Statements (15)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:economic_policy
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
asymmetric information
hiring process |
| gptkbp:category |
information economics
labor market theory |
| gptkbp:contrastsWith |
human capital theory
|
| gptkbp:describedBy |
gptkb:Spence's_1973_paper_"Job_Market_Signaling"
|
| gptkbp:explains |
how education can signal ability to employers
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
job market signaling
|
| gptkbp:proposedBy |
gptkb:Michael_Spence
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
labor economics
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
screening models
|
| gptkbp:won |
gptkb:Nobel_Prize_in_Economics_(2001,_for_Spence)
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:signaling_game
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|