Statements (23)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:economic_policy
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
asymmetric information
rational agents |
| gptkbp:describes |
signaling in labor markets
|
| gptkbp:explains |
how education can signal worker ability
|
| gptkbp:field |
economics
information economics |
| gptkbp:hasConcept |
costly signaling
pooling equilibrium separating equilibrium |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Spence signaling model
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
screening models
theory of signaling games |
| gptkbp:proposedBy |
gptkb:Michael_Spence
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Job_Market_Signaling_(1973)
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Nobel_Prize_in_Physics
adverse selection screening (economics) |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
game theory
labor economics contract theory |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:signaling_game
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|