Statements (33)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
game theory concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
non-cooperative games
|
| gptkbp:canBe |
mixed strategy
pure strategy |
| gptkbp:category |
solution concept
|
| gptkbp:defines |
no player can benefit by changing strategy while others keep theirs unchanged
|
| gptkbp:describes |
strategy profile
|
| gptkbp:example |
gptkb:battle_of_the_sexes
gptkb:prisoner's_dilemma coordination game |
| gptkbp:existenceTheorem |
every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies)
|
| gptkbp:field |
gptkb:mathematics
game theory |
| gptkbp:form |
best response correspondence
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Nash equilibrium
|
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1950
|
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:John_Nash
|
| gptkbp:notNecessarily |
Pareto optimal
|
| gptkbp:proofPublishedYear |
1951
|
| gptkbp:provenBy |
gptkb:John_Nash
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Annals_of_Mathematics
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Pareto_efficiency
correlated equilibrium dominant strategy equilibrium mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
computer science
economics evolutionary biology political science |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:John_Forbes_Nash_Jr.
gptkb:John_Nash |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
4
|