Statements (20)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:mathematical_concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
repeated games
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
perfect monitoring
players are patient (high discount factor) |
| gptkbp:field |
game theory
|
| gptkbp:formedBy |
1970s
|
| gptkbp:generalizes |
Nash equilibrium in repeated games
|
| gptkbp:hasVariant |
gptkb:folk_theorem_with_imperfect_private_monitoring
gptkb:folk_theorem_with_imperfect_public_monitoring |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
folk theorem
|
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
folk (as in 'folklore')
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Nash_equilibrium
gptkb:prisoner's_dilemma subgame perfect equilibrium |
| gptkbp:state |
in infinitely repeated games, a wide range of payoff profiles can be sustained as Nash equilibria
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:economic_policy
evolutionary biology political science |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Game_theory
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
5
|