folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring
GPTKB entity
Statements (26)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
game theory concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
repeated games
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
players observe imperfect public signals
stage game is repeated infinitely |
| gptkbp:citation |
gptkb:Abreu,_Pearce,_and_Stacchetti_(1990)
|
| gptkbp:describes |
conditions for sustaining cooperation in repeated games
|
| gptkbp:developedBy |
gptkb:David_Pearce
gptkb:David_Abreu gptkb:Ennio_Stacchetti |
| gptkbp:generalizes |
folk theorem with perfect monitoring
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
folk theorem with imperfect public monitoring
|
| gptkbp:implies |
many payoff profiles can be sustained as equilibrium
|
| gptkbp:publicationYear |
1990
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Econometrica
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:folk_theorem
imperfect public monitoring |
| gptkbp:requires |
public signals
sufficient patience of players |
| gptkbp:state |
cooperation can be sustained as equilibrium with imperfect public signals
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:economic_policy
industrial organization contract theory mechanism design collusion analysis |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:folk_theorem
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|