folk theorem with imperfect private monitoring
GPTKB entity
Statements (23)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
game theory concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
repeated games
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
monitoring is imperfect
players observe private signals |
| gptkbp:describes |
conditions for sustaining cooperation
|
| gptkbp:generalizes |
folk theorem with perfect monitoring
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
folk theorem with imperfect private monitoring
|
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1990s
|
| gptkbp:keyAuthors |
gptkb:David_K._Levine
gptkb:Eric_Maskin gptkb:M._Kandori gptkb:Drew_Fudenberg |
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Econometrica
gptkb:Journal_of_Economic_Theory |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:folk_theorem
imperfect private monitoring |
| gptkbp:requires |
sufficiently patient players
|
| gptkbp:studiedIn |
gptkb:economic_policy
theoretical computer science |
| gptkbp:usedFor |
analyzing collusion
analyzing cooperation in repeated games |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:folk_theorem
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|