Statements (54)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
Game theory concept
Repeated game |
| gptkbp:feature |
Payoff matrix
Memory of previous moves Possibility of cooperation Possibility of retaliation Repeated rounds |
| gptkbp:hasApplication |
gptkb:Ethics
gptkb:Psychology gptkb:artificial_intelligence gptkb:environmental_policy gptkb:law Ecology Computer science International relations Behavioral economics Distributed systems Sociobiology Multi-agent systems Social networks Business negotiation Collective action problems Evolution of cooperation Evolutionary computation Network theory Peer-to-peer networks Public goods games Reputation systems |
| gptkbp:hasStrategy |
gptkb:Always_Defect
gptkb:Grim_Trigger gptkb:Tit_for_Tat Random Always Cooperate |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
|
| gptkbp:notableFor |
gptkb:Axelrod's_Tournament
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:train
gptkb:Prisoner's_Dilemma Repeated games Reciprocal altruism Social dilemma |
| gptkbp:result |
Cooperation can emerge
Defection can be punished Long-term relationships matter |
| gptkbp:studiedBy |
gptkb:Robert_Axelrod
|
| gptkbp:studiedIn |
gptkb:Game_theory
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:Sociology
gptkb:Evolutionary_biology gptkb:Political_science Economics |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Generous_Tit_for_Tat
gptkb:Robert_Axelrod's_tournaments gptkb:Axelrod's_Tournament gptkb:N-person_iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|