Statements (18)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:strategy
|
| gptkbp:advantage |
robustness to errors
|
| gptkbp:contrastsWith |
gptkb:Tit_for_Tat
|
| gptkbp:describes |
A strategy that cooperates unless the opponent defects, but sometimes forgives defection.
|
| gptkbp:effect |
promotes cooperation in noisy environments
|
| gptkbp:feature |
forgiveness
cooperation retaliation random forgiveness |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Generous Tit for Tat
|
| gptkbp:originatedIn |
game theory
|
| gptkbp:proposedBy |
gptkb:Martin_Nowak
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Tit_for_Tat
|
| gptkbp:studiedIn |
evolutionary game theory
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:Iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma
|
| gptkbp:yearProposed |
1992
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Tit_for_Tat
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|