Statements (24)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:strategy
|
| gptkbp:characteristic |
gptkb:collaboration
retaliatory |
| gptkbp:effect |
robust against exploitation
vulnerable to noise |
| gptkbp:firstDescribed |
gptkb:Anatol_Rapoport
1980 |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Tit for Tat
|
| gptkbp:notableFor |
gptkb:prisoner's_dilemma
|
| gptkbp:notablePublication |
gptkb:Robert_Axelrod's_tournaments
gptkb:The_Evolution_of_Cooperation_(book) |
| gptkbp:principle |
start with cooperation
then mimic opponent's previous move |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
forgiveness
reciprocity evolution of cooperation |
| gptkbp:result |
promotes cooperation
|
| gptkbp:studiedIn |
iterated prisoner's dilemma
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
game theory
|
| gptkbp:variant |
gptkb:Generous_Tit_for_Tat
gptkb:Win-Stay,_Lose-Shift |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Laurel_and_Hardy
gptkb:Stan_Laurel |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
5
|