iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

GPTKB entity

Predicate	Object
gptkbp:instanceOf	game theory concept repeated game
gptkbp:dependsOn	payoff matrix number of rounds strategy choice
gptkbp:features	memory of previous moves possibility of cooperation possibility of retaliation repeated rounds
gptkbp:hasApplication	economics evolutionary biology political science psychology sociology
gptkbp:hasModel	gptkb:football gptkb:train conflict resolution cooperation reciprocal altruism
gptkbp:hasPayoff	gptkb:Punishment_(P) gptkb:Reward_(R) gptkb:Sucker's_payoff_(S) gptkb:Temptation_(T)
gptkbp:hasStrategy	gptkb:Always_Defect gptkb:Grim_Trigger gptkb:Tit_for_Tat Random Always Cooperate
gptkbp:hasVariant	gptkb:N-person_iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma gptkb:finite_iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma gptkb:infinite_iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma gptkb:noisy_iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma gptkb:spatial_iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma gptkb:stochastic_iterated_Prisoner's_Dilemma
https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label	iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
gptkbp:notableAchievement	cooperation can emerge defection is dominant in single-shot game forgiveness can be beneficial reputation matters shadow of the future promotes cooperation
gptkbp:notableFor	gptkb:Axelrod's_Tournament
gptkbp:payoffOrder	T > R > P > S
gptkbp:relatedTo	gptkb:Prisoner's_Dilemma
gptkbp:studiedBy	gptkb:Robert_Axelrod
gptkbp:studiedIn	gptkb:artificial_intelligence game theory multi-agent systems evolutionary game theory
gptkbp:bfsParent	gptkb:Prisoner's_Dilemma
gptkbp:bfsLayer	5