Statements (50)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
Game theory concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
gptkb:Non-cooperative_games
gptkb:Zero-sum_games Repeated games Multi-player games Two-player games Non-zero-sum games One-shot games |
| gptkbp:category |
Equilibrium concepts in game theory
|
| gptkbp:complexity |
PPAD-complete
|
| gptkbp:defines |
A set of strategies where no player can benefit by unilaterally changing their strategy
|
| gptkbp:existenceTheorem |
Every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium (possibly in mixed strategies)
|
| gptkbp:form |
Each player's strategy is a best response to the strategies of others
|
| gptkbp:generalizes |
gptkb:Cournot_equilibrium
Bertrand equilibrium |
| gptkbp:hasType |
gptkb:Evolutionarily_stable_strategy
Asymmetric Nash equilibrium Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium Pure strategy Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium Symmetric Nash equilibrium |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Nash Equilibria
|
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1950
|
| gptkbp:isNotNecessarily |
Pareto optimal
Socially optimal |
| gptkbp:isSolutionConceptOf |
Extensive form games
Strategic form games |
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:John_Nash
|
| gptkbp:provenBy |
gptkb:John_Nash
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Prisoner's_Dilemma
gptkb:Pareto_efficiency gptkb:Dominant_strategy_equilibrium Mixed strategy Pure strategy |
| gptkbp:usedFor |
gptkb:Mechanism_design
Analyzing competitive behavior Designing auctions Predicting outcomes in strategic situations Studying bargaining Studying evolutionary dynamics Studying network routing Studying oligopolies Studying traffic flow Studying voting systems |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:Evolutionary_biology
gptkb:Political_science Economics Computer science |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Subgame_Perfect_Equilibrium
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|