Statements (51)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
Game theory concept
Field of economics |
| gptkbp:application |
gptkb:legislation
Voting systems Procurement Network design School choice Auctions Healthcare allocation Market design Matching markets Public goods allocation |
| gptkbp:awarded |
gptkb:2007_Nobel_Prize_in_Economics
|
| gptkbp:developedBy |
gptkb:Eric_Maskin
gptkb:Leonid_Hurwicz gptkb:Roger_Myerson |
| gptkbp:focusesOn |
gptkb:Pareto_efficiency
Truthfulness Efficiency Strategy-proofness Budget balance Collusion resistance Incentive compatibility Individual rationality Private information Robustness to manipulation Social welfare maximization |
| gptkbp:hasSubfield |
Algorithmic mechanism design
Bayesian mechanism design Direct mechanism design Dynamic mechanism design Indirect mechanism design Stochastic mechanism design |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Mechanism design
|
| gptkbp:originatedIn |
1960s
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Econometrica
gptkb:Journal_of_Economic_Theory |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Nash_equilibrium
gptkb:Auction_theory gptkb:Dominant_strategy_equilibrium Social choice theory Contract theory Implementation theory Revelation principle Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism |
| gptkbp:studies |
Resource allocation
Design of economic mechanisms Incentive structures Social choice |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Quadratic_Voting
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|