Evolutionarily stable strategy
GPTKB entity
Statements (20)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
Game theory concept
|
| gptkbp:abbreviation |
gptkb:ESS
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
Economics
Biology |
| gptkbp:describes |
Strategy that cannot be invaded by a small number of mutants
|
| gptkbp:field |
Evolutionary game theory
|
| gptkbp:hasMathematicalFormulation |
If all members of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy can do better
|
| gptkbp:hasProperty |
Resistant to alternative strategies
Stable under natural selection |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Evolutionarily stable strategy
|
| gptkbp:introduced |
gptkb:John_Maynard_Smith
gptkb:George_R._Price |
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1973
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Nash_equilibrium
gptkb:Prisoner's_dilemma Hawk-Dove game |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
Population dynamics
Behavioral ecology |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Nash_Equilibrium
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|