Statements (52)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:logic
|
| gptkbp:analyzes |
bidding strategies
auction outcomes |
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
resource allocation
market design |
| gptkbp:awarded |
Nobel Prize in Economics 2020
|
| gptkbp:field |
economics
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Auction theory
|
| gptkbp:includes |
gptkb:English_auction
first-price auction second-price auction Dutch auction |
| gptkbp:notableContributor |
gptkb:Paul_Milgrom
gptkb:Robert_Wilson gptkb:Roger_Myerson gptkb:William_Vickrey |
| gptkbp:originatedIn |
20th century
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
game theory
mechanism design |
| gptkbp:studies |
auctions
sniping combinatorial auctions revenue equivalence theorem sealed-bid auctions auctioneer strategies bid increments bidder asymmetry bidder collusion bidder participation collusion in auctions common value auctions dynamic auctions efficiency of allocation entry costs entry deterrence information revelation multi-unit auctions open outcry auctions optimal auction design private value auctions repeated auctions reserve prices risk aversion in auctions shill bidding winner's curse |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
Advertising
spectrum auctions art auctions procurement auctions |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Bayesian_Nash_equilibrium
gptkb:Mechanism_design |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|