Statements (52)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
game theory concept
non-zero-sum game strategic game |
| gptkbp:example |
gptkb:paradox
|
| gptkbp:firstDescribed |
gptkb:Melvin_Dresher
gptkb:Merrill_Flood |
| gptkbp:generalizes |
iterated prisoner's dilemma
public goods game stag hunt n-player prisoner's dilemma |
| gptkbp:hasApplication |
gptkb:business
gptkb:environmental_policy gptkb:international_relations gptkb:law_enforcement arms race evolution of cooperation public goods cartel cheating |
| gptkbp:hasDominantStrategy |
defect
|
| gptkbp:hasNashEquilibrium |
both defect
|
| gptkbp:hasPayoffMatrix |
cooperate-cooperate: moderate reward for both
defect-defect: moderate punishment for both cooperate-defect: cooperator gets worst punishment, defector gets high reward defect-cooperate: defector gets high reward, cooperator gets worst punishment |
| gptkbp:hasStrategy |
gptkb:grim_trigger
random always cooperate always defect tit for tat |
| gptkbp:hasType |
simultaneous game
non-cooperative game symmetric game |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Prisoner's dilemma
|
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1950
|
| gptkbp:namedFor |
gptkb:Albert_W._Tucker
|
| gptkbp:numberOfPlayers |
2
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:train
altruism iterated prisoner's dilemma cooperation social dilemma tit for tat |
| gptkbp:studiedIn |
economics
evolutionary biology political science psychology |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
evolutionary game theory
experimental economics behavioral game theory |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Chicken_game
gptkb:Melvin_Dresher |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|