Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility
GPTKB entity
Statements (18)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:mechanism_design_concept
|
| gptkbp:abbreviation |
DSIC
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
auctions
voting mechanisms |
| gptkbp:contrastsWith |
gptkb:Bayesian_Incentive_Compatibility
|
| gptkbp:defines |
A property of a mechanism where truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all participants.
|
| gptkbp:field |
game theory
mechanism design |
| gptkbp:guarantees |
truthful reporting
|
| gptkbp:importantFor |
prevents manipulation in mechanisms
|
| gptkbp:inventedBy |
gptkb:economist
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
incentive compatibility
strategy-proofness |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:Vickrey_auction
gptkb:Groves_mechanism |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Mechanism_Design
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility
|