Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
GPTKB entity
Statements (21)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
mechanism design concept
|
| gptkbp:abbreviation |
gptkb:BIC
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
gptkb:Bayesian_games
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
rational agents
common prior private information |
| gptkbp:contrastsWith |
ex-post incentive compatibility
|
| gptkbp:defines |
A property of a mechanism where each participant maximizes expected utility by truthfully reporting private information, given beliefs about others.
|
| gptkbp:field |
game theory
mechanism design |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
|
| gptkbp:introduced |
gptkb:Roger_Myerson
|
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1981
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:revelation_principle
dominant strategy incentive compatibility |
| gptkbp:requires |
agents have beliefs about others' types
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
resource allocation
auction theory public goods provision |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Mechanism_Design
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|