Vickrey auction

GPTKB entity

Statements (56)
Predicate Object
gptkbp:instance_of gptkb:market
gptkbp:applies_to public goods
gptkbp:benefits potential for collusion
truthful bidding
gptkbp:can_lead_to revenue equivalence theorem
gptkbp:characteristic second-price bidding
gptkbp:designed_by gptkb:William_Vickrey
gptkbp:first_introduced gptkb:1961
https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label Vickrey auction
gptkbp:is open auction
gptkbp:is_a strategy-proof auction
gptkbp:is_analyzed_in gptkb:strategy
gptkbp:is_applied_in private sales
gptkbp:is_common_in everyday transactions
small-scale auctions
gptkbp:is_compared_to Dutch auction
English auction
gptkbp:is_considered a mechanism design problem
a fair auction format
a benchmark for auction formats
a theoretical auction model
gptkbp:is_criticized_for lack of transparency
gptkbp:is_efficient_when bidders have private values
gptkbp:is_evaluated_by expected utility theory
social welfare functions
gptkbp:is_explored_in gptkb:economic_analysis
economic literature
experimental economics
auction design research
market design research
mechanism design research
gptkbp:is_influenced_by information asymmetry
bidders' risk preferences
gptkbp:is_popular_in government auctions
gptkbp:is_related_to sealed bid first-price auction
sealed bid second-price auction
gptkbp:is_used_in art auctions
bidding strategies
online auctions
real estate auctions
charity auctions
gptkbp:is_used_to maximize seller's revenue
encourage competition
minimize bidder's regret
gptkbp:outcome highest bidder wins but pays second-highest bid
gptkbp:prize_pool honest valuation
gptkbp:promotes efficient allocation
gptkbp:related_to auction theory
gptkbp:requires bidders to submit sealed bids
gptkbp:suitable_for common value auctions
situations with risk-averse bidders
situations with correlated values
gptkbp:type sealed-bid auction
gptkbp:used_in spectrum auctions
gptkbp:bfsParent gptkb:William_Vickrey
gptkbp:bfsLayer 6