all-pay auction

GPTKB entity

Statements (23)
Predicate Object
gptkbp:instanceOf auction type
gptkbp:analyzes gptkb:Nash_equilibrium
gptkbp:feature expected revenue equals value of the prize in symmetric case
all bidders pay their bids
bids are sunk costs
can be single or multiple prize
can have symmetric or asymmetric bidders
can lead to overbidding
highest bidder wins the prize
losers also pay their bids
gptkbp:field economics
game theory
https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label all-pay auction
gptkbp:relatedTo first-price auction
war of attrition
gptkbp:studiedBy Dan Levin
James Friedman
Robert G. Chambers
gptkbp:usedIn contests
political lobbying
rent-seeking
gptkbp:bfsParent gptkb:Auction_Theory
gptkbp:bfsLayer 8