Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanism
GPTKB entity
Statements (27)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
mechanism
auction theory concept |
| gptkbp:application |
public goods allocation
combinatorial auctions |
| gptkbp:category |
auction mechanism
economic mechanism truthful mechanism |
| gptkbp:feature |
dominant strategy incentive compatibility
maximizes social welfare |
| gptkbp:field |
game theory
mechanism design |
| gptkbp:firstPublished |
1971
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves Mechanism
|
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:William_Vickrey
Edward H. Clarke Theodore Groves |
| gptkbp:property |
efficient allocation
strategy-proof |
| gptkbp:purpose |
incentivize truthful reporting
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Vickrey_auction
gptkb:Groves_mechanism Clarke tax |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
spectrum auctions
resource allocation network routing |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Mechanism_Design
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|