Statements (28)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
auction mechanism
mechanism design concept |
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
resource allocation
public goods allocation combinatorial auctions |
| gptkbp:field |
computer science
economics game theory |
| gptkbp:form |
maximizes social welfare
truthful bidding is optimal |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
VCG mechanism
|
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1970s
|
| gptkbp:limitation |
can be susceptible to collusion
computationally hard in some settings may not be budget balanced |
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:Groves
gptkb:Clarke gptkb:William_Vickrey |
| gptkbp:property |
efficient
dominant strategy incentive compatible strategy-proof |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Vickrey_auction
gptkb:Groves_mechanism Clarke tax |
| gptkbp:usedIn |
auction theory
mechanism design |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Bidding_to_the_Top:_VCG_and_Equilibria_of_Position-Based_Auctions
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|