Statements (55)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:academic
|
| gptkbp:application |
resource allocation
elections group decision-making public choice fair division |
| gptkbp:hasSubfield |
gptkb:Pareto_efficiency
revolutionary neutrality voting systems anonymity majority rule minority rights mechanism design independence of irrelevant alternatives axiomatic approach fair division apportionment social welfare functions monotonicity coalition formation preference aggregation manipulability collective rationality single-peaked preferences strategy-proofness aggregation paradoxes collective choice rules collective utility dictatorship theorem impossibility theorems judgment aggregation preference cycles preference relations social choice correspondences social welfare orderings voting paradoxes |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Social Choice
|
| gptkbp:notable_for |
gptkb:Condorcet_method
gptkb:Gibbard–Satterthwaite_theorem gptkb:Arrow's_impossibility_theorem gptkb:Borda_count |
| gptkbp:notablePerson |
gptkb:Amartya_Sen
gptkb:Kenneth_Arrow gptkb:Duncan_Black |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
welfare economics
voting theory collective decision-making |
| gptkbp:studiedBy |
gptkb:economist
gptkb:mathematician philosophers political scientists |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:SIGecom
gptkb:Mechanism_Design |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|