Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem

GPTKB entity

Statements (19)
Predicate Object
gptkbp:instanceOf gptkb:mathematical_concept
social choice theory theorem
gptkbp:appliesTo voting systems
social choice functions
gptkbp:author gptkb:Mark_Satterthwaite
gptkb:Allan_Gibbard
gptkbp:consequence Strategic voting is inevitable in non-dictatorial voting systems with three or more choices.
gptkbp:field social choice theory
voting theory
https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
gptkbp:namedAfter gptkb:Mark_Satterthwaite
gptkb:Allan_Gibbard
gptkbp:publishedIn gptkb:Journal_of_Economic_Theory
gptkbp:relatedTo gptkb:Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
gptkbp:sentence Every non-dictatorial, deterministic, and onto voting rule with at least three alternatives is manipulable.
gptkbp:yearProved 1973
gptkbp:bfsParent gptkb:Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
gptkb:Voting_theory
gptkbp:bfsLayer 6