Statements (51)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:economic_policy
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
gptkb:legislation
resource allocation market design voting systems public goods allocation |
| gptkbp:developedBy |
gptkb:Eric_Maskin
gptkb:Leonid_Hurwicz gptkb:Roger_Myerson |
| gptkbp:fieldOfStudy |
economics
game theory |
| gptkbp:firstPublished |
1960s
|
| gptkbp:focusesOn |
design of economic mechanisms
implementation theory incentive compatibility social choice |
| gptkbp:hasConcept |
gptkb:revelation_principle
gptkb:Pareto_efficiency Bayesian incentive compatibility budget balance dominant strategy incentive compatibility implementation in Nash equilibrium individual rationality social welfare maximization |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Mechanism Design Theory
|
| gptkbp:NobelPrizeInEconomics |
2007
|
| gptkbp:notableFor |
gptkb:Vickrey_auction
gptkb:environmental_policy corporate governance spectrum auctions kidney exchange matching markets regulatory policy school choice blockchain consensus mechanisms crowdsourcing mechanisms energy market design healthcare allocation labor market design procurement auctions public project provision taxation mechanisms |
| gptkbp:notablePublication |
gptkb:Hurwicz_(1960)_'Optimality_and_Informational_Efficiency_in_Resource_Allocation_Processes'
gptkb:Maskin_(1977)_'Nash_Equilibrium_and_Welfare_Optimality' gptkb:Myerson_(1981)_'Optimal_Auction_Design' |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
information economics
auction theory contract theory principal-agent problem |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Roger_Myerson
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
5
|