Statements (22)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:mathematical_concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
repeated games
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
perfect monitoring
|
| gptkbp:describes |
possible equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
|
| gptkbp:field |
game theory
|
| gptkbp:firstFormalizedBy |
gptkb:Robert_Aumann
James Friedman |
| gptkbp:generalizes |
imperfect monitoring Folk Theorem
|
| gptkbp:hasVariant |
Aumann's Folk Theorem
Friedman's Folk Theorem |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Folk Theorem
|
| gptkbp:namedBecause |
result was known informally before formal proof
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Nash_equilibrium
gptkb:prisoner's_dilemma subgame perfect equilibrium |
| gptkbp:requires |
players are sufficiently patient
|
| gptkbp:state |
any feasible and individually rational payoff can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
gptkb:economic_policy
evolutionary biology political science |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Repeated_Games
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|