Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report
GPTKB entity
Statements (72)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instance_of |
gptkb:reports
|
| gptkbp:concluded_on |
failure of foam insulation caused the disaster
|
| gptkbp:contains |
technical analysis of the accident
|
| gptkbp:focus |
investigation of the Columbia disaster
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report
|
| gptkbp:impact |
led to changes in NASA policies
|
| gptkbp:includes |
testimony from NASA employees
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
gptkb:Columbia_Space_Shuttle_Program
|
| gptkbp:length |
approximately 400 pages
|
| gptkbp:publication_year |
August 2003
|
| gptkbp:published_by |
gptkb:Columbia_Accident_Investigation_Board
|
| gptkbp:recommendation |
improve decision-making processes
foster a culture of safety create a culture of accountability improve stakeholder engagement conduct regular safety audits create a safety culture assessment tool develop a comprehensive risk assessment process establish independent safety oversight implement better risk management practices improve crisis management protocols improve shuttle design create a safety advisory panel develop a comprehensive safety strategy develop a safety training curriculum establish a safety leadership program increase funding for safety initiatives enhance the role of safety in organizational change improve the effectiveness of safety training programs address organizational issues at NASA conduct regular safety training for all employees create a safety feedback mechanism create a safety mentoring program create a safety performance dashboard create a safety recognition program create a safety-focused organizational culture create a safety-focused organizational structure develop a comprehensive training program develop a more robust engineering process develop a safety communication strategy develop a safety culture improvement plan develop a safety improvement plan develop a safety incident investigation process develop a safety performance measurement system engage with external experts enhance engineering oversight enhance public transparency enhance risk communication enhance shuttle safety measures enhance the role of safety in decision-making enhance the role of safety in project management enhance the role of safety in project planning enhance training for shuttle crews establish a safety management system establish a safety reporting system improve NASA safety culture improve communication within NASA improve incident reporting mechanisms improve materials testing improve the effectiveness of safety audits improve the effectiveness of safety committees improve the effectiveness of safety communication. increase collaboration with other space agencies prioritize safety over schedule enhance the role of safety in performance evaluations improve the integration of safety into engineering processes enhance the role of safety in organizational learning improve the effectiveness of safety reporting systems |
| gptkbp:related_to |
STS-107 mission
|
| gptkbp:subject |
gptkb:Space_Shuttle_Columbia
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Columbia_disaster
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
4
|