Columbia Accident Investigation Board
GPTKB entity
Statements (120)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instance_of |
gptkb:mythical_creatures
|
| gptkbp:challenges |
foam insulation debris caused the disaster
|
| gptkbp:collaborated_with |
other organizations
|
| gptkbp:community_engagement |
highly encouraged
|
| gptkbp:concluded_on |
February 2004
|
| gptkbp:contributed_to |
NASA reforms
|
| gptkbp:dissolved |
gptkb:2004
|
| gptkbp:established_in |
gptkb:President_George_W._Bush
|
| gptkbp:final_recommendations |
implement safety management systems
|
| gptkbp:final_report_release_date |
August 2003
|
| gptkbp:formed |
gptkb:2003
|
| gptkbp:has_meetings |
held
held in 2004 |
| gptkbp:headquarters |
gptkb:Washington,_D._C.
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
|
| gptkbp:impact |
NASA's future missions
|
| gptkbp:investigated_incident |
gptkb:STS-107
|
| gptkbp:investigates |
7 months
root cause analysis approximately 8 months multidisciplinary over 200 pages organizational culture issues failure of thermal protection system |
| gptkbp:investigation_timeline |
January 2003 to August 2003
|
| gptkbp:key_people |
gptkb:Dale_Myers
gptkb:Linda_Ham gptkb:George_W._Bush gptkb:Charles_D._Bolden gptkb:Robert_L._Crippen gptkb:John_W._Young gptkb:Eileen_Collins gptkb:Richard_Truly gptkb:Thomas_Stafford gptkb:William_P._Rogers_Jr. |
| gptkbp:legacy |
influenced aerospace safety
|
| gptkbp:location |
gptkb:United_States
|
| gptkbp:media_coverage |
extensive
|
| gptkbp:members |
gptkb:9
|
| gptkbp:notable_work |
foam insulation debris
technical failures and organizational issues |
| gptkbp:number_of_members |
gptkb:7
|
| gptkbp:parent_agency |
gptkb:NASA
NASA, FAA, DOD |
| gptkbp:public_interest |
high
|
| gptkbp:publications |
interim reports
|
| gptkbp:purpose |
investigate the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster
|
| gptkbp:recommendation |
enhance safety culture
foster a culture of safety conduct regular safety audits conduct regular safety drills develop a safety incident database establish a safety advisory panel establish independent safety oversight improve shuttle design increase transparency in decision-making increase collaboration with international space agencies develop a comprehensive safety strategy engage stakeholders in safety discussions improve data collection on safety incidents improve public communication about risks promote safety as a core value review contractor safety practices review shuttle launch criteria conduct regular safety assessments conduct safety drills for emergency scenarios conduct safety workshops for staff conduct thorough investigations of all incidents create a safety reporting system develop a comprehensive emergency response plan develop a long-term safety vision develop a new crew transport vehicle develop a risk assessment framework develop a safety leadership program develop a safety mentorship program engage with external safety experts enhance engineering analysis capabilities enhance oversight of shuttle operations enhance risk management processes enhance safety protocols for shuttle landings enhance safety training for engineers ensure accountability for safety failures establish a safety culture assessment tool establish a safety office within NASA implement better communication protocols improve crisis management training improve incident response protocols improve safety awareness campaigns improve safety communication during missions improve safety communication with astronauts improve safety communication with stakeholders improve safety metrics and reporting improve safety training for ground personnel improve training for astronauts increase funding for safety initiatives review safety practices of subcontractors review safety protocols for shuttle launches review safety protocols for shuttle repairs review shuttle maintenance practices safety improvements for NASA enhance safety training for mission control personnel NASA should prioritize safety improve NASA safety practices |
| gptkbp:recommendation_implementation |
monitored by NASA
|
| gptkbp:related_to |
gptkb:NASA
|
| gptkbp:report_released |
August 2003
|
| gptkbp:reports_to |
gptkb:Report_of_the_Columbia_Accident_Investigation_Board
gptkb:Columbia_Accident_Investigation_Board_Report |
| gptkbp:result |
gptkb:2004
gptkb:Columbia_Accident_Investigation_Board_Report |
| gptkbp:safety |
assessed
|
| gptkbp:seating_capacity |
gptkb:William_P._Rogers_Jr.
gptkb:William_C._Rogers |
| gptkbp:witnesses |
witnesses
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Columbia
gptkb:Space_Shuttle_Columbia gptkb:Columbia_disaster gptkb:Challenger_Commission gptkb:Columbia_disaster_(2003) |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
4
|