Statements (23)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:game_theory_strategy
|
| gptkbp:category |
repeated games
|
| gptkbp:characteristic |
gptkb:collaboration
forgiving retaliatory |
| gptkbp:failsWhen |
noise or misunderstanding is high
|
| gptkbp:firstDescribed |
gptkb:Anatol_Rapoport
1980 |
| gptkbp:notableFor |
evolution of cooperation
|
| gptkbp:optimalWhen |
future interactions are likely
|
| gptkbp:principle |
start with cooperation
then mimic opponent's previous move |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
grim trigger strategy
reciprocal altruism win-stay, lose-shift strategy |
| gptkbp:result |
forgives after punishment
promotes mutual cooperation punishes defection |
| gptkbp:studiedBy |
gptkb:Robert_Axelrod
|
| gptkbp:usedIn |
iterated prisoner's dilemma
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:The_Evolution_of_Cooperation
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
tit for tat strategy
|