Statements (28)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
Auction Type
|
| gptkbp:alsoKnownAs |
Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
Resource allocation
Online advertising Spectrum auctions |
| gptkbp:biddingType |
Sealed-bid
|
| gptkbp:category |
Sealed-bid auction
Single-item auction |
| gptkbp:field |
gptkb:Auction_Theory
gptkb:Game_Theory Economics |
| gptkbp:firstDescribed |
1961
|
| gptkbp:form |
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Vickrey Auction
|
| gptkbp:incentiveProperty |
Incentive compatible
|
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:William_Vickrey
|
| gptkbp:notableFor |
Promoting honest bidding
|
| gptkbp:paymentRule |
Winner pays second-highest bid
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Dutch_Auction
English Auction First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction |
| gptkbp:strategy |
Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy
|
| gptkbp:usedFor |
Allocating goods
Allocating services |
| gptkbp:winnerDetermination |
Highest bidder wins
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Mechanism_Design
gptkb:Secret_Auctions |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|