Tit for Tat strategy

GPTKB entity

Statements (64)
Predicate Object
gptkbp:instance_of gptkb:strategy
gptkbp:adapted_into various contexts
gptkbp:can_be_used_to model human interactions
gptkbp:can_lead_to stable outcomes
gptkbp:characterized_by reciprocal cooperation
gptkbp:designed_for iterated prisoner's dilemma
gptkbp:emphasizes forgiveness
gptkbp:encourages mutual cooperation
gptkbp:first_introduced gptkb:Robert_Axelrod
https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label Tit for Tat strategy
gptkbp:is_analyzed_in gptkb:economic_analysis
gptkbp:is_applied_in real-world scenarios
business negotiations
environmental negotiations
gptkbp:is_associated_with fairness
gptkbp:is_atype_of reciprocal strategy
gptkbp:is_based_on conditional responses
gptkbp:is_challenged_by more complex strategies
gptkbp:is_cited_in academic literature
gptkbp:is_considered a foundational concept
a practical approach
a benchmark for other strategies
a fundamental strategy in game theory.
a robust strategy
a starting point for analysis
gptkbp:is_countered_by all-destroy strategy
gptkbp:is_criticized_for lack of complexity
gptkbp:is_effective_against gptkb:diplomatic_relations
social dilemmas
random strategies
repeated interactions
tit for two tats
gptkbp:is_evaluated_by experimental economics
gptkbp:is_examined_in gptkb:sociology
political science
gptkbp:is_explored_in computer simulations
network theory
philosophy of ethics
gptkbp:is_influenced_by gptkb:cultural_factors
gptkbp:is_influential_in social sciences
gptkbp:is_linked_to trust building
gptkbp:is_noted_for its simplicity
its effectiveness in certain conditions
gptkbp:is_often_compared_to other strategies
gptkbp:is_part_of cooperative game theory
gptkbp:is_popular_in negotiation theory
gptkbp:is_related_to cooperative behavior
gptkbp:is_simple_to_implement gptkb:true
gptkbp:is_studied_in gptkb:psychology
evolutionary biology
gptkbp:is_tested_for laboratory experiments
gptkbp:is_used_in gptkb:computer_science
gptkb:strategy
gptkbp:is_used_to model competition
analyze conflict resolution
understand altruism
gptkbp:is_vulnerable_to exploitation
gptkbp:modifications variations like generous tit for tat
gptkbp:promotes long-term cooperation
gptkbp:requires memory of past interactions
gptkbp:responds_to previous actions
gptkbp:was_akey_figure_in evolutionary game theory
gptkbp:bfsParent gptkb:Axelrod's_tournament
gptkbp:bfsLayer 7