Statements (52)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:economic_policy
|
| gptkbp:analyzes |
reaction functions
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
oligopoly
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
imperfect competition
barriers to entry profit maximization complete information static game homogeneous products no collusion sequential moves rational players simultaneous price setting not allowed |
| gptkbp:contrastsWith |
gptkb:Cournot_competition
gptkb:Bertrand_competition |
| gptkbp:describes |
strategic interaction between firms
|
| gptkbp:example |
automobile industry
energy markets telecommunications industry airline industry |
| gptkbp:extendsTo |
dynamic games
multiple firms differentiated products |
| gptkbp:features |
leader-follower dynamic
|
| gptkbp:field |
microeconomics
industrial organization |
| gptkbp:firstDescribed |
1934
|
| gptkbp:followerAdvantage |
reacts to leader's choice
|
| gptkbp:followerFirm |
chooses output after leader
|
| gptkbp:form |
backward induction
|
| gptkbp:generalizes |
Cournot model
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Stackelberg competition
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
modern industrial organization theory
|
| gptkbp:leaderAdvantage |
first-mover advantage
|
| gptkbp:leaderFirm |
chooses output first
|
| gptkbp:limitation |
assumes perfect information
does not account for collusion |
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
Heinrich Freiherr von Stackelberg
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
game theory
market structure duopoly |
| gptkbp:result |
leader earns higher profit than follower
market price lower than Cournot equilibrium total output higher than Cournot equilibrium |
| gptkbp:solvedBy |
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
|
| gptkbp:studiedIn |
economics textbooks
|
| gptkbp:usedFor |
analyzing market power
studying firm strategy |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Cournot_competition
gptkb:Bertrand_competition gptkb:Subgame_Perfect_Equilibrium |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|