Social Choice and Individual Values
GPTKB entity
Statements (53)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
book
|
| gptkbp:author |
gptkb:Kenneth_Arrow
|
| gptkbp:contributedTo |
Public choice theory
Collective decision-making |
| gptkbp:field |
Economics
Political Science |
| gptkbp:hasVersion |
1st edition
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Social Choice and Individual Values
|
| gptkbp:impact |
gptkb:Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
|
| gptkbp:influencedBy |
Welfare economics
Pareto efficiency |
| gptkbp:ISBN |
978-0471000162
|
| gptkbp:language |
English
|
| gptkbp:majorCities |
Social choice theory
|
| gptkbp:notableFeature |
Decision theory
Social justice Game theory Voting systems Independence of irrelevant alternatives Political economy Utility theory Borda count Majority rule Public goods Externalities Collective preferences Preference aggregation Social welfare function Strategic voting Market failures Ethics in economics Social choice mechanisms Choice under uncertainty Collective rationality Equity in resource allocation Fairness in decision-making Individual rationality Interpersonal comparisons of utility Manipulation of voting systems Non-dictatorship condition Normative economics Positive economics Preference orderings Social choice functions Social choice paradoxes Transitivity of preferences Universality condition Condorcet_method Arrow's_conditions Arrow's_theorem |
| gptkbp:pageCount |
320
|
| gptkbp:publisher |
Wiley
|
| gptkbp:releaseYear |
1951
|