Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
GPTKB entity
Statements (16)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:academic_journal
|
| gptkbp:author |
gptkb:Robert_J._Barro
David B. Gordon |
| gptkbp:citation |
many subsequent works in monetary economics
|
| gptkbp:doi |
10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-X
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
theoretical models of central bank behavior
|
| gptkbp:language |
English
|
| gptkbp:publicationYear |
1983
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Journal_of_Monetary_Economics
|
| gptkbp:topic |
gptkb:economic_policy
macroeconomics policy credibility rules versus discretion |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Jordi_Galí
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|