Statements (23)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:Game_theory_model
|
| gptkbp:application |
Labor economics
Industrial organization Negotiation analysis |
| gptkbp:assumes |
Perfect information
Two players Discounting of future payoffs |
| gptkbp:describes |
Alternating offers bargaining
|
| gptkbp:field |
gptkb:Game_theory
Economics |
| gptkbp:introduced |
gptkb:Ariel_Rubinstein
|
| gptkbp:introducedIn |
1982
|
| gptkbp:notableFor |
Strategic delay in bargaining
Time preference effects Unique equilibrium outcome |
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Econometrica
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Nash_bargaining_solution
gptkb:Ultimatum_game |
| gptkbp:solvedBy |
Subgame perfect equilibrium
|
| gptkbp:type |
Non-cooperative bargaining model
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Bargaining_Theory
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Rubinstein Bargaining Model
|