Statements (54)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:economic_policy
political science theory |
| gptkbp:analyzes |
behavior of bureaucrats
behavior of interest groups behavior of politicians behavior of voters |
| gptkbp:awarded |
James M. Buchanan Nobel Prize in Economics 1986
|
| gptkbp:criticizedFor |
assumption of benevolent government
|
| gptkbp:field |
economics
political science |
| gptkbp:focusesOn |
collective decision-making
application of economic methods to political processes |
| gptkbp:hasConcept |
self-interest
voting systems government failure rent-seeking principal-agent problem logrolling rational choice |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Public Choice Theory
|
| gptkbp:notableWork |
gptkb:The_Calculus_of_Consent
|
| gptkbp:originatedIn |
gptkb:Gordon_Tullock
gptkb:James_M._Buchanan |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
game theory
political economy social choice theory constitutional economics |
| gptkbp:studies |
gptkb:government
gptkb:legislation taxation majority rule minority rights collective bargaining political corruption lobbying externalities public goods policy outcomes special interest groups median voter theorem coalition formation free rider problem government inefficiency bureaucratic behavior political incentives collective action problems constitutional rules political entrepreneurship political market public sector decision-making rational ignorance voter ignorance |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Marginal_Revolution_blog
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|