Statements (24)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:Economic_concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
gptkb:insurance
Banking Corporate governance Government guarantees |
| gptkbp:contrastsWith |
Adverse selection
|
| gptkbp:defines |
Situation where one party takes risks because another party bears the cost of those risks
|
| gptkbp:example |
Insured individuals taking greater risks
Banks taking excessive risks due to government bailouts |
| gptkbp:firstDescribed |
Economists in the 19th century
|
| gptkbp:mitigatedBy |
Monitoring
Deductibles Co-payments Incentive alignment |
| gptkbp:occurredIn |
A party insulated from risk behaves differently than if fully exposed to the risk
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
Principal-agent problem
Asymmetric information |
| gptkbp:studiedIn |
gptkb:insurance
Economics Finance |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Kate_Jennings
gptkb:Loan_Forgiveness |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Moral Hazard
|