Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
GPTKB entity
Statements (18)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:mathematical_concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
voting systems
social choice functions |
| gptkbp:author |
gptkb:Mark_Satterthwaite
gptkb:Allan_Gibbard |
| gptkbp:field |
social choice theory
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
|
| gptkbp:implies |
strategic voting is inevitable in non-dictatorial voting systems with three or more choices
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
mechanism design
voting theory |
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:Mark_Satterthwaite
gptkb:Allan_Gibbard |
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Journal_of_Economic_Theory
|
| gptkbp:relatedConcept |
gptkb:Arrow's_impossibility_theorem
|
| gptkbp:sentence |
Every non-dictatorial, deterministic, and onto voting rule with at least three alternatives is manipulable.
|
| gptkbp:yearProved |
1973
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Mechanism_Design
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
8
|