Statements (51)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instance_of |
gptkb:Artificial_Intelligence
|
| gptkbp:adapted_into |
different contexts
|
| gptkbp:analyzes |
a bipartite graph
|
| gptkbp:applies_to |
non-bipartite graphs
|
| gptkbp:based_on |
proposing and rejecting
|
| gptkbp:can_be_extended_by |
multiple groups
|
| gptkbp:developed_by |
gptkb:David_Gale
gptkb:Lloyd_Shapley |
| gptkbp:difficulty |
O(n^2)
|
| gptkbp:ensures |
stability of matches
|
| gptkbp:has_programs |
college admissions
job matching |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Gale-Shapley algorithm
|
| gptkbp:is_a |
matching algorithm
|
| gptkbp:is_a_solution_for |
stable marriage problem
|
| gptkbp:is_analyzed_in |
theoretical computer science
|
| gptkbp:is_considered |
a foundational algorithm
a classic algorithm fair matching method |
| gptkbp:is_criticized_for |
potential instability in real-world applications
|
| gptkbp:is_described_as |
game theory literature
|
| gptkbp:is_evaluated_by |
empirical studies
stability criteria |
| gptkbp:is_explored_in |
research papers
|
| gptkbp:is_implemented_in |
gptkb:computer_science
various programming languages matching markets |
| gptkbp:is_informed_by |
gptkb:theorem
|
| gptkbp:is_known_for |
deferred acceptance algorithm
|
| gptkbp:is_optimized_for |
receivers
proposers |
| gptkbp:is_related_to |
gptkb:battle
algorithm design combinatorial optimization stable matching |
| gptkbp:is_studied_in |
gptkb:Mathematician
|
| gptkbp:is_used_in |
economics
resource allocation social sciences market design matching theory online dating platforms school choice problems |
| gptkbp:is_used_to |
pair individuals
|
| gptkbp:modifications |
handle ties
|
| gptkbp:published_by |
gptkb:1962
|
| gptkbp:requires |
preferences list
|
| gptkbp:suitable_for |
incomplete preferences
|
| gptkbp:training |
algorithm courses
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Shirley_Shapley
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
5
|