Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
E324675
"Competition in Telecommunications" is an influential economic analysis of regulation, market structure, and incentives in the telecommunications industry, co-authored by Jean Tirole and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) canonical | 2 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T3081244 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Context triple: [Jean Tirole, notableWork, Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)]
-
A.
The Antitrust Paradox
The Antitrust Paradox is a highly influential 1978 book by legal scholar Robert Bork that reshaped U.S. antitrust law by arguing that its primary goal should be the protection of consumer welfare rather than competitors.
-
B.
Walrasian market-clearing framework
The Walrasian market-clearing framework is a general equilibrium model in which perfectly competitive markets continuously adjust prices so that supply equals demand in all markets simultaneously.
-
C.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
D.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
-
E.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Target entity description: "Competition in Telecommunications" is an influential economic analysis of regulation, market structure, and incentives in the telecommunications industry, co-authored by Jean Tirole and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
-
A.
The Antitrust Paradox
The Antitrust Paradox is a highly influential 1978 book by legal scholar Robert Bork that reshaped U.S. antitrust law by arguing that its primary goal should be the protection of consumer welfare rather than competitors.
-
B.
Walrasian market-clearing framework
The Walrasian market-clearing framework is a general equilibrium model in which perfectly competitive markets continuously adjust prices so that supply equals demand in all markets simultaneously.
-
C.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
-
D.
Coase theorem
The Coase theorem is an economic theory stating that if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs are negligible, private bargaining will lead to an efficient allocation of resources regardless of the initial assignment of rights.
-
E.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (48)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic monograph
ⓘ
book ⓘ economics book ⓘ non-fiction book ⓘ |
| about |
design of regulatory institutions in network industries
ⓘ
economic analysis of telecommunications regulation ⓘ pricing of network access for entrants ⓘ transition from monopoly to competition in telecom ⓘ |
| author |
Jean Tirole
ⓘ
Jean-Jacques Laffont ⓘ |
| contribution |
analysis of optimal access pricing rules
ⓘ
design of incentive schemes for regulated firms ⓘ formal modeling of telecom regulation ⓘ framework for evaluating telecom liberalization policies ⓘ |
| field |
industrial organization
ⓘ
regulatory economics ⓘ telecommunications economics ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
access pricing
ⓘ
asymmetric information in regulation ⓘ entry and competition in telecom markets ⓘ incentive-compatible regulation ⓘ interconnection charges ⓘ liberalization of telecommunications ⓘ network externalities ⓘ network interconnection ⓘ nonlinear pricing ⓘ price cap regulation ⓘ regulation of incumbent operators ⓘ regulatory commitment problems ⓘ two-part tariffs ⓘ unbundling of network elements ⓘ universal service obligations ⓘ vertical relationships in telecommunications ⓘ |
| genre | scholarly work ⓘ |
| hasCoauthor |
Jean Tirole
ⓘ
Jean-Jacques Laffont ⓘ |
| influenced |
academic research on telecom competition
ⓘ
telecommunications regulation policy debate ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| mainSubject |
competition policy
ⓘ
incentive regulation ⓘ market structure ⓘ regulation ⓘ telecommunications industry ⓘ |
| theoreticalFramework |
game theory
ⓘ
mechanism design ⓘ microeconomic theory ⓘ principal–agent theory ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
The pipeline generated the facts above by prompting gpt-5.1 with this entity's name + description and the instruction below.
Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: Competition in Telecommunications (with Jean-Jacques Laffont) Description of subject: "Competition in Telecommunications" is an influential economic analysis of regulation, market structure, and incentives in the telecommunications industry, co-authored by Jean Tirole and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
subject surface form:
Jean Tirole