Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources

E137815

"Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources" is a scholarly work that uses game theory and institutional analysis to explain how communities can successfully self-govern shared resources without relying solely on markets or centralized authorities.

All labels observed (1)

Label Occurrences
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources canonical 1

How this entity was disambiguated

Statements (45)

Predicate Object
instanceOf book
non-fiction book
scholarly work
appliesTheory institutional analysis and development framework
non-cooperative game theory
arguesThat communities can self-govern common-pool resources
effective local rules can prevent overuse of shared resources
markets and central authorities are not the only governance solutions
author Elinor Ostrom
James Walker
Roy Gardner
contribution bridges experimental game theory and field research on commons
offers empirical evidence of successful self-governance of CPRs
provides systematic framework for analyzing rules in use
critiques simple tragedy of the commons models
demonstrates effects of monitoring and sanctioning rules
importance of rule configurations for outcomes in commons dilemmas
role of communication among resource users
field environmental governance
institutional economics
political economy
public policy
focusesOn design of rules for shared resources
experimental games
field studies of resource users
self-organization of communities
hasConcept appropriation dilemmas
collective-choice rules
constitutional rules
design of institutions for CPRs
nested enterprises in governance
operational rules
provision dilemmas
intendedAudience graduate students
policy analysts
researchers
language English
mainSubject collective action
common-pool resources
game theory
governance of the commons
institutional analysis
resource management
self-governance
relatedTo Governing the Commons

How these facts were elicited

Referenced by (1)

Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.

Elinor Ostrom notableWork Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources