Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
E137815
"Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources" is a scholarly work that uses game theory and institutional analysis to explain how communities can successfully self-govern shared resources without relying solely on markets or centralized authorities.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T1206696 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
Target entity: Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources Context triple: [Elinor Ostrom, notableWork, Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources]
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A.
The Complexity of Cooperation
The Complexity of Cooperation is a scholarly work by Avi Wigderson that explores how ideas from computational complexity theory illuminate strategic behavior, game theory, and cooperative problem-solving.
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B.
Species Packing and Competitive Equilibrium for Many Species
"Species Packing and Competitive Equilibrium for Many Species" is a foundational ecological theory paper that analyzes how numerous species can coexist by partitioning resources and reaching competitive equilibrium within shared environments.
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C.
The Economics of Exhaustible Resources
The Economics of Exhaustible Resources is a seminal work in environmental and resource economics that develops the theoretical foundations for how societies should optimally use and manage finite natural resources over time.
-
D.
On Equilibrium
On Equilibrium is a philosophical work by John Ralston Saul that explores the importance of balancing key human qualities—such as reason, ethics, and common sense—to create a more humane and democratic society.
-
E.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Target entity: Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources Target entity description: "Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources" is a scholarly work that uses game theory and institutional analysis to explain how communities can successfully self-govern shared resources without relying solely on markets or centralized authorities.
-
A.
The Complexity of Cooperation
The Complexity of Cooperation is a scholarly work by Avi Wigderson that explores how ideas from computational complexity theory illuminate strategic behavior, game theory, and cooperative problem-solving.
-
B.
Species Packing and Competitive Equilibrium for Many Species
"Species Packing and Competitive Equilibrium for Many Species" is a foundational ecological theory paper that analyzes how numerous species can coexist by partitioning resources and reaching competitive equilibrium within shared environments.
-
C.
The Economics of Exhaustible Resources
The Economics of Exhaustible Resources is a seminal work in environmental and resource economics that develops the theoretical foundations for how societies should optimally use and manage finite natural resources over time.
-
D.
On Equilibrium
On Equilibrium is a philosophical work by John Ralston Saul that explores the importance of balancing key human qualities—such as reason, ethics, and common sense—to create a more humane and democratic society.
-
E.
Nash bargaining solution
The Nash bargaining solution is a foundational concept in game theory that defines a fair and efficient outcome for two-party bargaining problems based on axioms of rationality and symmetry.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (45)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
book
ⓘ
non-fiction book ⓘ scholarly work ⓘ |
| appliesTheory |
institutional analysis and development framework
ⓘ
non-cooperative game theory ⓘ |
| arguesThat |
communities can self-govern common-pool resources
ⓘ
effective local rules can prevent overuse of shared resources ⓘ markets and central authorities are not the only governance solutions ⓘ |
| author |
Elinor Ostrom
ⓘ
James Walker ⓘ Roy Gardner ⓘ |
| contribution |
bridges experimental game theory and field research on commons
ⓘ
offers empirical evidence of successful self-governance of CPRs ⓘ provides systematic framework for analyzing rules in use ⓘ |
| critiques | simple tragedy of the commons models ⓘ |
| demonstrates |
effects of monitoring and sanctioning rules
ⓘ
importance of rule configurations for outcomes in commons dilemmas ⓘ role of communication among resource users ⓘ |
| field |
environmental governance
ⓘ
institutional economics ⓘ political economy ⓘ public policy ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
design of rules for shared resources
ⓘ
experimental games ⓘ field studies of resource users ⓘ self-organization of communities ⓘ |
| hasConcept |
appropriation dilemmas
ⓘ
collective-choice rules ⓘ constitutional rules ⓘ design of institutions for CPRs ⓘ nested enterprises in governance ⓘ operational rules ⓘ provision dilemmas ⓘ |
| intendedAudience |
graduate students
ⓘ
policy analysts ⓘ researchers ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| mainSubject |
collective action
ⓘ
common-pool resources ⓘ game theory ⓘ governance of the commons ⓘ institutional analysis ⓘ resource management ⓘ self-governance ⓘ |
| relatedTo | Governing the Commons ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
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You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Subject: Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources Description of subject: "Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources" is a scholarly work that uses game theory and institutional analysis to explain how communities can successfully self-govern shared resources without relying solely on markets or centralized authorities.
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.