Statements (49)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:academic
field of economics |
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
gptkb:insurance
labor economics law and economics corporate finance public economics |
| gptkbp:awardReceived |
Nobel Prize in Economics 2016 (Hart and Holmström)
|
| gptkbp:developedBy |
20th century
|
| gptkbp:hasConcept |
gptkb:revelation_principle
commitment enforcement signaling bargaining verifiability mechanism design screening incomplete contracts renegotiation complete contracts |
| gptkbp:hasKeyContributors |
gptkb:Jean-Jacques_Laffont
gptkb:Jean_Tirole gptkb:Eric_Maskin gptkb:John_Moore gptkb:Bengt_Holmström gptkb:Oliver_Hart |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Contract Theory
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
Contract Theory (book by Bolton and Dewatripont)
Foundations of Contract Theory (book by Segal and Tirole) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (book by Laffont and Tirole) |
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:law
gptkb:agency_theory game theory microeconomics organizational economics mechanism design theory |
| gptkbp:studies |
contracts
incentives moral hazard adverse selection information asymmetry principal-agent problems |
| gptkbp:usedFor |
gptkb:legislation
corporate governance policy design analyzing incentives designing contracts |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Mathias_Dewatripont
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
7
|