Statements (27)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:macroeconomic_model
|
| gptkbp:analyzes |
gptkb:economic_policy
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
rational expectations
government as policy maker public forms expectations |
| gptkbp:basisFor |
dynamic inconsistency literature
|
| gptkbp:category |
gptkb:economic_policy
game theory |
| gptkbp:describes |
time inconsistency problem
|
| gptkbp:explains |
inflationary bias
|
| gptkbp:field |
economics
macroeconomics |
| gptkbp:focusesOn |
inflation
unemployment |
| gptkbp:influenced |
rules vs discretion debate
|
| gptkbp:proposedBy |
gptkb:Robert_Barro
gptkb:David_Gordon |
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Journal_of_Political_Economy
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Kydland-Prescott_model
|
| gptkbp:shows |
commitment can improve outcomes
discretionary policy leads to higher inflation |
| gptkbp:usedFor |
central bank credibility analysis
|
| gptkbp:yearProposed |
1983
|
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Robert_Barro
gptkb:Robert_J._Barro |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Barro-Gordon model
|