Statements (19)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:mathematical_concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
Bayesian agents
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
common knowledge of posteriors
common prior |
| gptkbp:consequence |
rational agents cannot agree to disagree under the theorem's assumptions
|
| gptkbp:field |
game theory
|
| gptkbp:hasConcept |
If two Bayesian agents have common priors and their posteriors are common knowledge, then their posteriors must be equal.
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Aumann's agreement theorem
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
gptkb:epistemic_game_theory
philosophy of knowledge |
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:Robert_Aumann
|
| gptkbp:publicationYear |
1976
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Annals_of_Statistics
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
gptkb:Bayesian_probability
agreement in economics common knowledge |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Robert_Aumann
gptkb:Robert_J._Aumann |
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
5
|