Statements (19)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instanceOf |
gptkb:mathematical_concept
|
| gptkbp:appliesTo |
Bayesian agents
|
| gptkbp:assumes |
common knowledge
common prior |
| gptkbp:citation |
many works in economics and philosophy
|
| gptkbp:consequence |
if two people are Bayesian rational and have common knowledge of each other's beliefs, their beliefs must be equal
|
| gptkbp:field |
game theory
|
| gptkbp:hasConcept |
two agents with common priors and common knowledge of their posteriors cannot agree to disagree
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
gptkb:epistemic_game_theory
philosophy of knowledge |
| gptkbp:namedAfter |
gptkb:Robert_Aumann
|
| gptkbp:publicationYear |
1976
|
| gptkbp:publishedIn |
gptkb:Annals_of_Statistics
|
| gptkbp:relatedTo |
common knowledge
Bayesian updating agreement in probability |
| gptkbp:bfsParent |
gptkb:Complexity_of_Agreement
|
| gptkbp:bfsLayer |
6
|
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Aumann's Agreement Theorem
|