Statements (96)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| gptkbp:instance_of |
gptkb:Advisory_Services
|
| gptkbp:cabinet_member |
gptkb:William_C._Schneider
|
| gptkbp:collaboration |
government and industry experts
|
| gptkbp:concluded_on |
design flaws
design flaws contributed to the accident management issues existed |
| gptkbp:contributed_to |
NASA's safety culture
the redesign of the Apollo spacecraft |
| gptkbp:critical_analysis |
NASA's operational practices
|
| gptkbp:disbanded |
report completion
|
| gptkbp:dissolved |
gptkb:1968
|
| gptkbp:emphasized_the_need_for |
systematic safety reviews
|
| gptkbp:formed |
gptkb:1967
|
| gptkbp:founded_in |
gptkb:astronaut
the Apollo 1 fire incident |
| gptkbp:has_meetings |
NASA facilities
|
| gptkbp:held_hearings_in |
January 1967
|
| gptkbp:highlights |
safety culture
importance of communication importance of oversight importance of testing |
| https://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#label |
Apollo 1 Review Board
|
| gptkbp:included_experts_in |
engineering and safety
|
| gptkbp:influenced |
gptkb:future_space_missions
future NASA missions |
| gptkbp:investigates |
gptkb:Apollo_1_accident
|
| gptkbp:is_a_key_component_of |
NASA's response to the accident
|
| gptkbp:is_a_moment_of |
NASA's safety protocols
|
| gptkbp:is_analyzed_in |
fire safety measures
|
| gptkbp:is_critical_for |
NASA's oversight
|
| gptkbp:is_examined_in |
manufacturing processes
safety culture design specifications test procedures training protocols crew training procedures |
| gptkbp:is_focused_on |
crew safety
safety issues |
| gptkbp:is_recognized_by |
human factors
key issues thorough investigation contributions to safety impact on NASA organizational problems technical deficiencies poor communication as a factor |
| gptkbp:is_significant_for |
gptkb:space_exploration
|
| gptkbp:is_tasked_with |
assessing risks
analyzing data improving safety conducting interviews making recommendations preventing future accidents determining causes of the fire investigating causes reviewing documentation |
| gptkbp:issued_findings |
January 1968
|
| gptkbp:led_to |
changes in NASA policies
|
| gptkbp:led_to_improvements_in |
spacecraft safety protocols
|
| gptkbp:meets |
gptkb:multiple_times
|
| gptkbp:membership |
gptkb:engineers
gptkb:scientists administrators various organizations contractors |
| gptkbp:notable_event |
space exploration history
|
| gptkbp:part_of |
improve NASA's safety record
|
| gptkbp:proposed_by |
gptkb:Apollo_program
|
| gptkbp:published |
gptkb:Apollo_1_Accident_Investigation_Report
|
| gptkbp:published_report_on |
April 1967
|
| gptkbp:recommendation |
safety improvements
future missions enhanced safety protocols improved training better risk management better materials for spacecraft improved training for astronauts |
| gptkbp:reports_to |
gptkb:NASA
|
| gptkbp:was_a_landmark_investigation_into |
spacecraft design flaws.
|
| gptkbp:was_a_response_to |
public concern over space safety
tragic loss of crew |
| gptkbp:was_a_result_of |
the Apollo 1 tragedy
|
| gptkbp:was_established_to_ensure |
no similar accidents occurred
|
| gptkbp:was_influenced_by |
safety regulations
government oversight engineering standards previous accidents previous space program accidents |
| gptkbp:was_part_of |
gptkb:Apollo_program
Apollo program review |
| gptkbp:was_seen_as_a_necessary_step_for |
future missions
|
| gptkbp:was_supported_by |
gptkb:government_officials
gptkb:scientific_community engineering teams NASA personnel |
| gptkbp:was_tasked_with_reviewing |
Apollo program safety measures
|