Triple
T9986252
| Position | Surface form | Disambiguated ID | Type / Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject | Hotelling’s law |
E196773
|
entity |
| Predicate | relatedTo |
P37
|
FINISHED |
| Object |
median voter theorem
The median voter theorem is a principle in political science and economics stating that in majority-rule elections with single-peaked preferences, candidates or parties tend to converge on the policy position preferred by the median voter.
|
E833552
|
NE FINISHED |
How this triple was built (4 steps)
Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.
NER
Named-entity recognition
gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: median voter theorem | Statement: [Hotelling’s law, relatedTo, median voter theorem]
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: median voter theorem Context triple: [Hotelling’s law, relatedTo, median voter theorem]
-
A.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
B.
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a fundamental result in social choice theory showing that every reasonable voting system with at least three options is susceptible to strategic manipulation by voters.
-
C.
Condorcet paradox
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
-
D.
Condorcet criterion
The Condorcet criterion is a voting system standard requiring that if a candidate would win every head-to-head contest against each other candidate, that candidate must be the overall election winner.
-
E.
Swing Vote
Swing Vote is a 2008 American political comedy-drama film in which a single man's vote unexpectedly decides a deadlocked U.S. presidential election.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NEDg
Description generation
gpt-5.1
Instruction
Generate a one-sentence description of the target entity. You are given a context triple in the form (subject, predicate, object), where the object is the target entity. # Instructions Use the triple to infer relevant information about the entity. Describe the entity based on what is most defining, well-known. Avoid repeating the information from the triple, unless really essential. # Response Format Return only the sentence: "Description: [one-sentence description of the target entity]"
Input
Entity: median voter theorem Triple: [Hotelling’s law, relatedTo, median voter theorem]
Generated description
The median voter theorem is a principle in political science and economics stating that in majority-rule elections with single-peaked preferences, candidates or parties tend to converge on the policy position preferred by the median voter.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: median voter theorem Target entity description: The median voter theorem is a principle in political science and economics stating that in majority-rule elections with single-peaked preferences, candidates or parties tend to converge on the policy position preferred by the median voter.
-
A.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is a foundational result in social choice theory showing that no voting system can convert individual preferences into a collective ranking while simultaneously satisfying a set of seemingly reasonable fairness criteria.
-
B.
Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a fundamental result in social choice theory showing that every reasonable voting system with at least three options is susceptible to strategic manipulation by voters.
-
C.
Condorcet paradox
The Condorcet paradox is a voting theory phenomenon where collective preferences can become cyclic and inconsistent, even when individual voters’ preferences are perfectly rational and transitive.
-
D.
Condorcet criterion
The Condorcet criterion is a voting system standard requiring that if a candidate would win every head-to-head contest against each other candidate, that candidate must be the overall election winner.
-
E.
Swing Vote
Swing Vote is a 2008 American political comedy-drama film in which a single man's vote unexpectedly decides a deadlocked U.S. presidential election.
- F. None of above. chosen
Provenance (5 batches)
The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.
| Step | Stage | Batch ID | Status | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| creating | Elicitation | batch_69ca82f1678c819093d06320a05f16a4 |
completed | March 30, 2026, 2:04 p.m. |
| NER | Named-entity recognition | batch_69cdc79af13c81909349ae0b0d5da946 |
completed | April 2, 2026, 1:34 a.m. |
| NED1 | Entity disambiguation (via context triple) | batch_69d258078488819086a58db79075e2b9 |
completed | April 5, 2026, 12:39 p.m. |
| NEDg | Description generation | batch_69d258f0e91881909fdda5a5f3e50d29 |
completed | April 5, 2026, 12:43 p.m. |
| NED2 | Entity disambiguation (via description) | batch_69d259bf38b08190b059dd7bd42d8862 |
completed | April 5, 2026, 12:46 p.m. |
Created at: March 30, 2026, 8:49 p.m.