Triple

T9313293
Position Surface form Disambiguated ID Type / Status
Subject M-root E224056 entity
Predicate supportsProtocol P203 FINISHED
Object DNSSEC E37203 NE FINISHED

How this triple was built (2 steps)

Every LLM step that produced this triple, in pipeline order — named-entity classification, the disambiguation choices (the exact options shown, with the pick highlighted), and the generated description. The batch + timestamp of each is in the Provenance table below.

NER Named-entity recognition gpt-5-mini
Instruction
Given a phrase, classify it is english named entity (e.g., persons, organizations, works of art) in Latin script, or not (e.g., literals, dates, URLs, verbose phrases). For disambiguation, the statement where the phrase occurs as object is also given. Please return a JSON object with `phrase` (string, the phrase being analyzed) and `is_ne` (boolean, indicating whether the phrase is a Named Entity).
Input
Phrase: DNSSEC | Statement: [M-root, supportsProtocol, DNSSEC]
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: DNSSEC
Context triple: [M-root, supportsProtocol, DNSSEC]
  • A. DNSSEC chosen
    DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) is a suite of specifications that adds cryptographic authentication and integrity protection to DNS data to prevent attacks such as cache poisoning and spoofing.
  • B. DNSSEC ZSK
    DNSSEC ZSK (Zone Signing Key) is the cryptographic key used in DNS Security Extensions to sign individual DNS zone data, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of DNS responses.
  • C. DNSKEY
    DNSKEY is a DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) resource record that stores public keys used to verify digital signatures and authenticate DNS data.
  • D. DNSSEC KSK
    The DNSSEC KSK (Key Signing Key) is a long-term cryptographic key used to sign and authenticate a zone’s DNSKEY records, forming the trust anchor at the top of the DNSSEC validation chain.
  • E. DNSSEC root key signing ceremony
    The DNSSEC root key signing ceremony is a highly controlled, regularly scheduled cryptographic event where trusted personnel generate and manage the root cryptographic keys that secure the global Domain Name System.
  • F. None of above.
  • G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.

Provenance (3 batches)

The batch behind each pipeline step, in order, with when it ran. Timestamps are batch-level — stages were processed in waves, so the object chain (NER → NED1 → NEDg → NED2) reads in order, but predicate / elicitation batches can sit in a different wave.

Step Stage Batch ID Status When
creating Elicitation batch_69ca8425f4fc81909c1c586e9a5b7530 completed March 30, 2026, 2:09 p.m.
NER Named-entity recognition batch_69cd20b048a081909fd7ec0b6b863063 completed April 1, 2026, 1:42 p.m.
NED1 Entity disambiguation (via context triple) batch_69d0f3a3fb288190ac38f8df19eb1e79 completed April 4, 2026, 11:19 a.m.
Created at: March 30, 2026, 7:37 p.m.